Children teach sensational information-as long as it is true.

When sharing information, teenagers and adults prioritize what is sensational or attention-grabbing, sometimes at the cost of the truth. Nothing is known so far about whether young children prefer to transmit sensational information or what they prioritize when the sensational quality of information conflicts with its truth. In two experiments (N = 136), 4- and 5-year-olds engaged in a forced-choice task in which they selected one of two statements to teach to a peer. In the absence of explicit truth value assignments, children of both ages preferred teaching sensational information over non-sensational (neutral) information (p < .0001). When information was sensational but untrue, truth trumped sensationalism in both age groups (p < .0001). The experiments shed more light on biases that affect the early ontogeny of information exchange. Not only do children prioritize certain kinds of information when teaching, they also actively weigh these preferences against one another and mute their bias for sensationalism when veracity is at stake.

Cultural evolution: A review of theoretical challenges.

The rapid growth of cultural evolutionary science, its expansion into numerous fields, its use of diverse methods, and several conceptual problems have outpaced corollary developments in theory and philosophy of science. This has led to concern, exemplified in results from a recent survey conducted with members of the Cultural Evolution Society, that the field lacks 'knowledge synthesis', is poorly supported by 'theory', has an ambiguous relation to biological evolution and uses key terms (e.g. 'culture', 'social learning', 'cumulative culture') in ways that hamper operationalization in models, experiments and field studies. Although numerous review papers in the field represent and categorize its empirical findings, the field's theoretical challenges receive less critical attention even though challenges of a theoretical or conceptual nature underlie most of the problems identified by Cultural Evolution Society members. Guided by the heterogeneous 'grand challenges' emergent in this survey, this paper restates those challenges and adopts an organizational style requisite to discussion of them. The paper's goal is to contribute to increasing conceptual clarity and theoretical discernment around the most pressing challenges facing the field of cultural evolutionary science. It will be of most interest to cultural evolutionary scientists, theoreticians, philosophers of science and interdisciplinary researchers.

Know thy audience: Children teach basic or complex facts depending on the learner's maturity.

What kind of information is appropriate to teach depends on learner characteristics. In three experiments, 5- to 7-year-old children (N = 170, 50% female, 68% White; data collection: 2022-2023) chose between basic and complex information to teach an infant or adult audience. The older, but not younger, children, taught more complex information to adults and more basic information to infants, (OR = 2.03). Both ages overcame their own preference for complex information when teaching infants (h = .45). Children's reflections on why they made particular pedagogical choices did not predict audience-contingent teaching. The findings suggest that young children can infer what kind of information is suitable given a learner's maturity, with a key developmental progression between ages 5 and 7.

Four-year-olds selectively transmit true information.

Two experiments (N = 112) were conducted to examine preschoolers' concern for the truth when transmitting information. A first experiment (Pilot Experiment) revealed that 4-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, selectively transmitted information marked as true versus information marked as false. The second experiment (Main Experiment) showed that 4-year-olds selectively transmitted true information regardless of whether their audience lacked knowledge (Missing Knowledge Context) or information (Missing Information Context) about the subject matter. Children selected more true information when choosing between true versus false information (Falsity Condition) and when choosing between true information versus information the truth of which was undetermined (Bullshit Condition). The Main Experiment also revealed that 4-year-olds shared information more spontaneously, i.e., before being prompted, when it was knowledge, rather than information, the audience was seeking. The findings add to the field's growing understanding of young children as benevolent sharers of knowledge.

Toddlers' expressions indicate that they track agent-object interactions but do not detect false object representations.

In the theory of mind debate, a middle position between nativism and conceptual change theory has gained traction. This position states that children younger than 4 years track agent-object relations (by building "records" of others' experiences) without cognizing how agents represent-or misrepresent-the objects they encounter. We tested these claims with 3.5-year-olds using puppet shows geared to evoke suspenseful expressions. In two experiments (N = 90), children watched an agent approach an object that looked like her favorite food but was inedible. In Experiment 1, children showed tense expressions when an agent's real food item was, unbeknownst to her, replaced with a fake food item. Children, however, showed no signs of understanding that the agent would mistake the deceptive object for food. Consistent with this, children's expressions in Experiment 2 did not differ when the agent approached a deceptive object compared with when she approached a non-deceptive object. The experiments support the middle position's view that toddlers track agent-object interactions but fail to recognize when agents misrepresent objects.

Four-Year-Olds Share General Knowledge and Use Generic Language When Teaching.

Young children's receptiveness to teaching is unquestioned, but their understanding of pedagogy has only begun to be explored. Two experiments (N = 90; 45 female) with 4-year-olds from racially and ethnically diverse backgrounds were conducted to test if they exchange general information and use generic language when teaching. Children in both experiments taught more general than episodic information and used more generic than episodic language when teaching. Experiment 2 showed that children did not prefer to report general information or use generic language in a non-pedagogical context. The findings suggest that by 4 years old, children understand that the goal of teaching is to transmit general knowledge.

No signs of automatic perspective-taking or its modulation by joint attention in toddlers using an object retrieval task.

It is currently debated whether simple forms of social perspective-taking that are in place by late infancy are performed automatically. We conducted two experiments (N = 124) to test whether 3-year-olds show automatic perspective-taking during object searches, and whether automatic perspective-taking is facilitated by joint attention. Children were asked to retrieve an object immediately after it was moved from one (L1) to another (L2) location within a container, e.g. a sandbox. In Experiment 1, a between-subjects design was used, with children being randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: one in which child and other jointly attended to the object in L1 (joint attention condition); one in which the other was present but unengaged with the child when the object was placed in L1 (other present condition) and a baseline condition in which only the child was present (no other condition). Automatic perspective-taking should manifest in biased searches toward L1 in the other present and joint attention conditions, but not in the no other condition. No automatic perspective-taking was observed in either experiment, regardless of whether the other person left and remained absent (Experiment 1) or returned after the object was relocated (Experiment 2). The findings contribute to a growing body of empirical data that questions the existence of automatic perspective-taking.

Sharing Experiences in Infancy: From Primary Intersubjectivity to Shared Intentionality.

We contrast two theses that make different assumptions about the developmental onset of human-unique sociality. The primary intersubjectivity thesis (PIT) argues that humans relate to each other in distinct ways from the beginning of life, as is shown by newborns' participation in face-to-face encounters or "primary intersubjectivity." According to this thesis, humans' innate relational capacity is the seedbed from which all subsequent social-emotional and social-cognitive developments continuously emerge. The shared intentionality thesis (SIT) states that human-unique forms of interaction develop at 9-12 months of age, when infants put their heads together with others in acts of object-focused joint attention and simple collaborative activities. According to this thesis, human-unique cognition emerges rapidly with the advent of mind-reading capacities that evolved specifically for the purpose of coordination. In this paper, we first contrast the two theses and then sketch the outlines of an account that unifies their strengths. This unified account endorses the PIT's recognition of the fundamental importance of primary intersubjectivity. Any act of sharing experiences is founded on the communicative capacity that is already displayed by young infants in primary intersubjectivity. At the same time, we question the PIT's interpretation that dyadic encounters have the triadic structure of joint attention. Lastly, we draw on empirical work on the development of joint attention, imitation, and social referencing that serves as evidence that primary intersubjectivity continuously unfolds into the capacity for triadic joint attention.

The role of eye contact in young children's judgments of others' visibility: A comparison of preschoolers with and without autism spectrum disorder.

Typically-developing (TD) children under age 5 often deny that they can see a person whose eyes are covered (e.g., Moll & Khalulyan, 2017). This has been interpreted as a manifestation of their preference for reciprocal interactions. We investigated how 3- to 4-year-old children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD, n = 12) respond in this situation. Because a lack of interpersonal connectedness and reciprocal communication are core features of this disorder, we predicted that young children with ASD will not make mutual regard a condition for seeing another person and therefore acknowledge being able to see her. Against this prediction, children with ASD gave the same negative answers as a group of TD (n = 36) age-mates. Various interpretations are discussed, including the possibility that some children with ASD are capable of relating to others as second persons.

Shared intentionality shapes humans' technical know-how.

Osiurak and Reynaud argue that cumulative technological culture is made possible by a "non-social cognitive structure" (sect. 1, para. 1) and they offer an account that aims "to escape from the social dimension" (sect. 1, para. 2) of human cognition. We challenge their position by arguing that human technical rationality is unintelligible outside of our species' uniquely social form of life, which is defined by shared intentionality (Kern & Moll 2017, Philosophical Psychology30(3):319-37; Tomasello 2019a, Becoming human: A theory of ontogeny. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press).

Counterfactual curiosity in preschool children.

We investigated whether young children are curious about what could have been ("counterfactual curiosity"). In two experiments, children aged 4 and 5 years (N = 32 in Experiment 1, N = 24 in Experiment 2) played a matching game in which they turned over cards in the hope that they matched a picture. After choosing a card, children could use "x-ray glasses" to uncover unchosen cards. In Experiment 1, most children spontaneously used the glasses to peek at past alternatives, even when the outcome could no longer be altered. In Experiment 2, children concentrated their information search on alternatives that were within their control. In both experiments, children showed greater interest in counterfactual outcomes when the card they chose turned out not to match the picture. The findings suggest that young children are curious not only about what is but also about what could have been. Curiosity about alternative outcomes seems to precede counterfactual reasoning.

Future planning in preschool children.

The capacity to plan ahead and provide the means for future ends is an important part of human practical reasoning. When this capacity develops in ontogeny is the matter of an ongoing debate. In this study, 4- and 5-year-olds performed a future planning task in which they had to create the means (a picture of a particular object, e.g., a banana) that was necessary to address a future end (of completing a game in which such a picture was missing). Children of both ages drew more targets than children in a control condition in which there was no future end to be pursued. Along with prior findings, the results suggest a major progression in children's future thinking between 3 and 5 years. Our findings expand on prior knowledge by showing that young children cannot only identify the probate means to future ends but determine such ends and create the means to achieve them, thus offering compelling evidence for future planning. (PsycINFO Database Record

2.5-Year-Olds Express Suspense When Others Approach Reality With False Expectations.

The study investigated if 2.5-year-olds are susceptible to suspense and express tension when others' false expectations are about to be disappointed. In two experiments (N = 32 each), children showed more tension when a protagonist approached a box with a false belief about its content than when she was ignorant. In Experiment 2, children also expressed more tension when the protagonist's belief was false than when it was true. The findings reveal that toddlers affectively anticipate the "rude awakening" of an agent who is about to discover unexpected reality. They thus not only understand false beliefs per se but also grasp the affective implications of being mistaken. The results are discussed with recourse to current theories about early understanding of false beliefs.

Three-year-olds express suspense when an agent approaches a scene with a false belief.

Research on early false belief understanding has entirely relied on affect-neutral measures such as judgments (standard tasks), attentional allocation (looking duration, preferential looking, anticipatory looking), or active intervention. We used a novel, affective measure to test whether preschoolers affectively anticipate another's misguided acts. In two experiments, 3-year-olds showed more expressions of suspense (by, e.g. brow furrowing or lip biting) when they saw an agent approach a scene with a false as opposed to a true belief (Experiment 1) or ignorance (Experiment 2). This shows that the children anticipated the agent's surprise and disappointment when encountering reality. The findings suggest that early implicit knowledge of false beliefs includes anticipations of the affective implications of erring. This vital dimension of beliefs should no longer be ignored in research on early theory of mind.

Preschoolers' mutualistic conception of seeing is related to their knowledge of the pronoun "each other".

Previous research has shown that young children deny being able to see an agent whose eyes are covered. The current study explored this phenomenon further. In Experiment 1, 3-year-olds denied that they could "see," but affirmed that they could "look at," a doll whose eyes were covered--indicating that they demand mutuality for seeing another but not for looking at another. In Experiment 2, 3.5-year-olds drew the same distinction between "see" and "look at" when facing a doll or a human. A strong correlation between children's knowledge of the reciprocal pronoun "each other" and their adherence to the mutuality demand was found. The results are discussed with respect to children's bias for second personal encounters and children's relational concept of persons.

The primacy of social over visual perspective-taking.

In this article, we argue for the developmental primacy of social over visual perspective-taking. In our terminology, social perspective-taking involves some understanding of another person's preferences, goals, intentions etc. which can be discerned from temporally extended interactions, including dialog. As is evidenced by their successful performance on various reference disambiguation tasks, infants in their second year of life first begin to develop such skills. They can, for example, determine which of two or more objects another is referring to based on previously expressed preferences or the distinct quality with which these objects were jointly explored. The pattern of findings from developmental research further indicates that this ability emerges sooner than analogous forms of visual perspective-taking. Our explanatory account of this developmental sequence highlights the primary importance of joint attention and the formation of common ground with others. Before children can develop an awareness of what exactly is seen or how an object appears from a particular viewpoint, they must learn to share attention and build common "experiential" ground. Learning about others' as well as one's own "snapshot" perspectives in a literal, i.e., optical sense of the term, is a secondary step that affords an abstraction from all (prior) pragmatic involvement with objects.

Taking versus confronting visual perspectives in preschool children.

Recent evidence suggests that 3-year-olds can take other people's visual perspectives not only when they perceive different things (Level 1) but even when they see the same thing differently (Level 2). One hypothesis is that 3-year-olds are good perspective takers but cannot confront different perspectives on the same object (Perner, Stummer, Sprung, & Doherty, 2002). In 2 studies using color filters, 3-year-olds were unable to judge in what color they and an adult saw the same picture. This was the case irrespective of whether children replied verbally (pilot study) or by pointing to color samples (main study). However, 3-year-olds readily took an adult's perspective by determining which of 2 objects an adult referred to as being a certain color, independently from how the children saw the objects (main study). Taken together, these results suggest that preschoolers' difficulty is not so much taking perspectives as it is directly confronting another's view with their own-an ability that seems to be acquired between 4 and 5 years of age.

Three-year-olds understand appearance and reality--just not about the same object at the same time.

Young children struggle in the classic tests of appearance versus reality. In the current Study 1, 3-year-olds had to determine which of 2 objects (a deceptive or a nondeceptive one) an adult requested when asking for the "real X" versus "the one that looks like X." In Study 2, children of the same age had to indicate what a single deceptive object (e.g., a chocolate-eraser) looked like and what it really was by selecting one of two items that represented this object's appearance (a chocolate bar) or identity (a regular eraser). Children were mainly successful in Study 1 but not in Study 2. The findings are discussed with a focus on young children's difficulty with "confronting" perspectives, which may be involved in their struggles with a number of classic theory of mind tasks.

Early social cognition in three cultural contexts.

The influence of culture on cognitive development is well established for school age and older children. But almost nothing is known about how different parenting and socialization practices in different cultures affect infants' and young children's earliest emerging cognitive and social-cognitive skills. In the current monograph, we report a series of eight studies in which we systematically assessed the social-cognitive skills of 1- to 3-year-old children in three diverse cultural settings. One group of children was from a Western, middle-class cultural setting in rural Canada and the other two groups were from traditional, small-scale cultural settings in rural Peru and India.In a first group of studies, we assessed 1-year-old children's most basic social-cognitive skills for understanding the intentions and attention of others: imitation, helping, gaze following, and communicative pointing.Children's performance in these tasks was mostly similar across cultural settings. In a second group of studies, we assessed 1-year-old children's skills in participating in interactive episodes of collaboration and joint attention.Again in these studies the general finding was one of cross-cultural similarity. In a final pair of studies, we assessed 2- to 3-year-old children's skills within two symbolic systems (pretense and pictorial). Here we found that the Canadian children who had much more experience with such symbols showed skills at an earlier age.Our overall conclusion is that young children in all cultural settings get sufficient amounts of the right kinds of social experience to develop their most basic social-cognitive skills for interacting with others and participating in culture at around the same age. In contrast, children's acquisition of more culturally specific skills for use in practices involving artifacts and symbols is more dependent on specific learning experiences.

How does it look? Level 2 perspective-taking at 36 months of age.

Previous research has found that children engage in Level 2 visual perspective-taking, that is, the understanding that others may see things in a different way, between 4 and 5 years of age (e.g., J. H. Flavell, B. A. Everett, K. Croft, & E. R. Flavell, 1981). This ability was reexamined in 36-month-olds using color filters. In Experiment 1 (N = 24), children had to recognize how an object looked to an adult when she saw it through a color filter. In Experiment 2 (N = 24), a novel production test was applied. Results of both studies show that 36-month-olds know how an object looks to another person. The discussion focuses on the psychological requirements of visual perspective-taking and its relation to other "theory of mind" abilities, such as the distinction between appearance and reality and understanding false belief.